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Introduction 
 
The Japanese invasion in 1937 was a major watershed for economic development and state 
building in China. Whereas the nationalist government had attempted to unify the country and 
mobilize resources for its economic and military ambitions, the various centers of power that 
emerged after 1937 — both Chinese and Japanese — entered into a fierce competition for the 
control of material resources. But modernization was no longer the objective. The control of 
commodities became an end in itself. The enduring conflict between the Japanese, the 
Chongqing-based nationalist government, the various puppet authorities, and the allied powers 
transformed China into a vast reservoir of goods, which each party sought to tap in order to 
support its war effort. 
 
The state of the economy in wartime China is a field that few historians have explored1. It is not 
my ambition to deal with such a vast topic. My focus will be limited to the Lower Yangzi area 
and Shanghai. The historically wealthiest region of China had become the major economic base 
of the Guomindang between 1927 and 1937. When the Japanese army drove out the Chinese 
troops, it started almost immediately to implement measures with the sole purpose of supplying 
its military needs either locally or further away in northern and northeastern China. The Japanese 
seem not to have made preparation for a long-term war and occupation. Instead of carrying out a 
carefully prepared blueprint, they elaborated over the years various sets of ad hoc measures 
through which they strove to turn the economic system into a command economy. Yet, their 
attempt eventually failed. 
 
Despite their military superiority and their capacity to impose new rules, the Japanese had to face 
a complex and elusive economic and social system. Furthermore, they were not the sole actors: 
Chinese merchants were far from passive and obviously tried to use the system to their 
advantage or to by-pass it. The Chongqing government was also present through various official 
organs in Shanghai or through companies run by the secret services. Finally, local and national 
governments of collaboration set up by the Japanese army definitely had their own agenda or, at 
least, sought to maximize their own resources. Fundamentally, the Japanese failed to find reliable 
allies in China, either out of distrust between the parties involved, or simply because corruption 
and instability ran the whole system havoc2. The history of Japanese occupation in the Lower 
Yangzi area is the history of an economic failure. Nevertheless, it was a very costly experience for 
which the Chinese common people (laobaixing) paid a very dear price. 
 
In this paper, I shall examine the policies carried out by the Japanese in and around Shanghai 
with the purpose of harnessing the local economy to support the war effort. It will establish that 
it was by and large an exercise in policy improvisation, supplemented by the establishment of 
overlapping agencies, though with the deliberate intention to monopolize Central China's 
resources. The second part of the paper will look into the structures and policies designed on the 
Chinese side, especially after the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government in Nanking. The 
third part will examine the impact of the controlled economy (tongzhi jingji) on the cotton industry 
in Shanghai. I shall not address here the problems of industrial production and organization, or 
the related and crucial issue of food supply. I have studied these topics in separate papers3. 
 
 
From improvisation to regulation: Japanese agencies in Central China (1937-
1941) 
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The initial phase of the war in Central China was dominated by military operations. One month 
after the Marco Polo incident in July 1937, the Japanese navy opened a second front in Shanghai 
where, against all expectations, it faced fierce resistance by the nationalist troops. After three 
months of bitter fighting, during which economic life was entirely paralyzed, the Japanese army 
eventually defeated the Chinese units engaged in the battle of Shanghai and moved up the Yangzi 
valley. All the major cities fell one after another, usually offering little fighting. The nationalist 
troops made another last ditch effort to defend the capital, but the Japanese won the battle and 
took their revenge on Chinese resistance through the infamous massacre of Nanking's civilian 
population. Afterward, the Japanese pursued their conquest to the east, to Wuhan, and toward 
the southern provinces. In the spring of 1938, the whole Central China region was firmly in the 
hands of the Japanese army. 
 
The demise of the nationalist administrations in Central China created a political vacuum, which 
the Japanese tried to fill up with the establishment of puppet authorities. They already had tried 
their hand in North China and Mongolia, not to mention Manchukuo years before4. In Central 
China, however, the Japanese could not rely on the same network of proxies or friends they had 
built up during the 1920s-1930s in North China. They improvised solutions that eventually ran 
against each other. In Shanghai, they inspired the establishment of the Dadao (Great Way) 
government under Su Xiwen, a Taiwan-imported scholar versed in Buddhism5. Although the 
Dadao government was designed to take over the administration of the former Chinese 
municipality, it seems that the Japanese special services initially harbored much larger ambitions. 
It may have served as the springboard for the formation of a regional government for Central 
China such as was created later in Nanking6. The lack of prestige of Su Xiwen and the blatant 
inefficiency and corruption of its government gave second thoughts to the Japanese. 
 
On the one hand, they turned to a more prestigious figure from the Shanghai business 
community, Fu Xiao'an, to take over the Shanghai municipality in October 1938. Su Xiwen was 
demoted to secretary-general. Fu actually had little power, but he assumed his role until his 
assassination in October 1940 by his servant7. His administration lived off the proceeds of 
gambling houses and opium dens in the infamous Badlands8. On the other hand, the Japanese 
endeavored to give a legitimate façade to their occupation of Central China. After a fruitless 
effort at attracting Tang Shaoyi, a senior figure of Republican politics, they had to content 
themselves with a group of retired or second-rank politicians to form a Reformed government 
(Weixin zhengfu) in Nanking. Liang Hongzhi, a former affiliate of Duan Qirui and the Anfu clique, 
presided over the destiny of a colorless and powerless body9. All attempts at recruiting able 
personnel to staff the new structure proved fruitless. From its inauguration in March 1938 to its 
demise in 1940, the Reformed government merely served as the stepping stone of the Japanese 
army in Central China10. It was not even able to assert its authority over Shanghai, which 
remained virtually autonomous under close monitoring by the Japanese Landing Party. 
 
The major political and institutional change came with the defection of Wang Jingwei in 1939 
and his acceptance to serve as the head of a new reformed government in Nanking one year later. 
Wang Jingwei offered a more serious political alternative to the Japanese in their fight against the 
regime of Chiang Kai-shek, even if Wang was not given much leeway until 1942, when the 
Japanese command started to realize it had to give some substance to its discourse on friendship 
and cooperation11. In the field of economic policy and decision-making, the reach of the Wang 
regime was limited to a much reduced "Central China". It actually comprised only Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. And even within this realm, the Japanese were in full command 
until 1943. In Shanghai, the death of Fu Xiao'an gave the Wang government the opportunity to 
appoint a close ally in the person of Chen Gongbo. Fu had proved fairly hostile to Wang's 
ambitions in Shanghai. Nevertheless, the appointment of Chen Gongbo did not prevent inter-
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agency competition and rivalries between the central and municipal government12. These rivalries 
became especially fierce when the regime turned to a system of command economy (tongzhi jingji) 
in 194313. 
 
It is against this institutional background that the Japanese army endeavored, and, to a large 
extent, succeeded in exploiting the material resources of Central China. Its efforts, however, were 
not met with commensurate rewards in Shanghai. Although the districts of the Chinese 
municipality came under its control, bombings and fires had destroyed a large part of the 
industrial potential during the three months of heavy fighting in 1937. The major challenge, 
however, was the existence of the foreign settlements where real wealth was concentrated, where 
the Chinese entrepreneurs moved their plants and equipment when the conflict was over, and 
where merchants and businessmen from Central China transferred their capital and their 
machines for safety. The heart of Shanghai was a huge safe, which the Japanese army was eager 
to tap. Yet extraterritorial privileges prevented it from extending its reach to these areas, at least 
until Pearl Harbor14. Furthermore, the two settlements offered a haven for the uncooperative 
local elites as well as for anti-Japanese activities by Chongqing agents. The stalemate that 
prevailed during the first four years of occupation provides a key to an understanding of the 
Japanese economic policy toward Central China and Shanghai. 
 
From 1938 to 1941, the Japanese army tried to mobilize all the resources at its disposal in Central 
China for its war effort. At the same time, falling short of pumping into Shanghai's wealth, the 
Japanese military imposed all sorts of obstacles to the movement of goods in order to seal off the 
city from its hinterland. Since there was no way to prevent the flow of goods from abroad, the 
Japanese forced the city's authorities, population and companies to rely on imports to assure their 
livelihood and production. The deliberate intent was to starve the city from the commodities 
without which it could not survive. One outstanding development in Shanghai imports was the 
ascendance of cereals to the first place in those imports. In the first quarter of 1941, cereals 
accounted for almost 30 percent of the city's total imports. One year before, cereals participated 
in imports with 13 percent only. But after April 1940, there was an almost complete cessation of 
shipments to Shanghai of China-grown cereals, partly because crops in the Japanese-occupied 
interior had continued to decline, and partly because everywhere in the Yangzi valley the 
Japanese seized all foodstuff surpluses for exportation to Japan15. This policy failed to bring 
Shanghai to its knees, even if it made life more expensive and unstable (Tables 3, 4, 5). It also 
pressed the Japanese authorities into a logic of increasingly severe control on the economy which 
ultimately led them to impose a full-scale system of controlled economy (tongzhi jingji).  
 
In the earlier phase of occupation of Central China, the Japanese policy was concerned mainly by 
establishing its control over the means of transportation and the movement of goods into or out 
of the zone of occupation. It was essential to prevent war-related commodities to find their way 
to nationalist-controlled areas16. There was no attempt at controlling prices or the actual 
distribution of goods. The focus was on the movement of goods. After the freezing of Japanese 
assets by the US and GB in July 1941 and the policy of blockade these two countries adopted vis-
à-vis Japan, a new era begun. The Japanese army set up various organizations with the sole 
purpose of imposing a strict control on the production, the transportation and the distribution of 
commodities. From there, they moved from trade to production and tried to control the whole 
production and distribution process. Later on, with the beginning of difficulties in the Pacific, the 
Japanese government initiated a "New policy" toward China and the Wang Jingwei regime. The 
new policy implied a more genuine collaboration between the two countries and transfers of 
power to Chinese organizations in the field of economic activity. 
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The first large-scale operation launched by the Japanese was the establishment of the Central 
China Development Company (Naka shina shinko kaisha) in November 1938. Its stated purpose 
was expressed in its name, but its real objective was the monopolization of trade in the lower 
Yangzi area17. The company was to focus on transportation, communications, public utilities 
(water, gas and electricity), mines, aquatic products, and actually anything deemed relevant by the 
company. It included also for a while a company dealing in Fabi, the Chinese legal currency, and 
one dealing in real estate18. The CCDC created 14 concerns under its umbrella, usually in the 
form of Sino-Japanese firms registered under Chinese law as enacted by the Reformed 
government19. No need to say that this was a façade. The initial capitalization of the CCDC was 
100 million yen, but by September 1942 the total assets of the 14 concerns reached 232,220,000 
yen, more than twice the original figure. Capital was raised by contributions from Japanese 
companies and by the issuing of shares. Its pre-tax profits between April 1941 and March 1942 
amounted to a remarkable 8,410,000-yen. By October 1943, the company harbored 16 
companies with headquarters located in Shanghai. Although they were under Japanese obedience, 
the general managers of seven of the firms were Chinese. Su Xiwen, the former mayor of the 
Dadao government in Shanghai, was the general manager of the China Navigation Company, a 
concern established in February 194020. 
 
The second major initiative was the creation of the Asia Development Board (Kôain) in 
December 1938 to take over policy-making and control in the field of economics in China. More 
broadly, the ADB served as a state administration on behalf of the Japanese army in Central 
China. In this region, the ADB was represented by a liaison department (Kachû 
renrakubu/Huazhong lianluobu). It came into existence in March 1939 with a staff of more than 
one hundred persons21. The ADB was very close to the Special services (Tomukubu) of the 
Japanese army. It was involved in the secret negotiations between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese 
government in Shanghai (Yu Yuan conference) and it served as the main policy-making body in 
occupied China. The ADB was behind most of the monopolistic regulations through which 
Japanese companies obtained a privileged access to resources in Central China. It was also 
behind the creation of such companies or professional associations, with the support of the 
Shanghai-based Japanese private companies. It should be noted that a fundamental aspect of the 
Japanese occupation in China was the skillful mobilization of the various sectors of the Japanese 
community, especially the business community. It is fair to say that the Japanese private firms 
were not dragooned into serving the military. They entered into partnerships willingly and took 
advantage of the privileges that accrued to the victors to drive away Chinese competitors and 
garner substantial benefits. The control of the main transportation artery — the Yangzi River — 
and, above all, the supply of a "free" currency by the army gave the Japanese merchants an 
undeniable leverage on trade. 
 
In the initial phase of its military invasion of Central China, the Japanese army used the Japanese 
yen to cover its purchases. By the time of the Hangzhouwan landing, however, the military 
command realized the costs of the conflict were bound to increase tremendously. To make up 
for its limited financial capabilities, the Japanese army started to issue its own currency — the so-
called "military scrip" (junpiao/gunpyô). Although in Shanghai the yen continued to be the currency 
of reference, in Central China the new scrip replaced it. At the end of 1938, the Japanese military 
authorities in Shanghai decided that the military scrip would become the sole currency for 
Central China. To back up their decision, they initiated the organization of 28 trade companies 
(zuhe/kumiai) and assembled them under a Central China Federation of import and distribution 
companies (Kachû yu-yû haikyû kumiai rengôkai/Huazhong shuru peiji zuhe lianhehui)22. The 
transportation of goods to North China or Shanghai was subject to a permit issued by the army 
and the goods had to go through the hands of one of the designated 28 companies. Moreover, to 
impose the extensive use of military scrip and eliminate the Chinese legal currency (fabi), the 
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Central China Expeditionary Army established the Distribution company of scrip-purchased 
commodities (Gunpyô kôkan yôbusshi haikyû kumiai/Junpiao jiaohuan yongwuzi peiji zuhe) in 
August 1939. Although it was a commercial venture, it originated from Japanese military 
headquarters. Its leadership structure was made of representatives of the economics department 
of the army, the ADB Central China liaison bureau, and the Shanghai-based office of the 
Japanese ministry of finance (Ôkurashô). The company first dealt only in silk, medicine, then in 
wool and wool products, paper, sugar, fuel, and cotton. It set up 30 bureaus in the major cities of 
Central China. The company had exclusive rights for the transportation and sale of these 
goods23. In Shanghai, the Special services of the Japanese army and the consulate also established 
a system of permits for the goods entering or leaving the city24. Its effect was limited as long as 
the settlements were allowed a free access to the sea. 
 
The consequences of the rigid, though informal, rules imposed by the Japanese army created 
much discontent among displaced foreign companies. At the end of 1938, 11 of Shanghai's 
leading foreign trade and civic associations announced a common front against trade aggressions 
imposed by Japanese authorities in Shanghai25. Official spokesmen claimed Japan had, and would 
never have, intentions of infringing upon the rights and interests of foreigners. Kejin Kodama, 
the president of the Central China Development Company — the 100 million-yen officially 
sponsored holding firm — stated without humor that "Activities of this company will not 
constitute a threat to the vested rights and interests of third-party Powers in China. The purpose 
of the firm is solely to assist the economic development of Central China. Foreign capitalists are 
invited to invest in the various enterprises of the concern". The Japanese standard response was 
that the situation in the areas occupied by Japanese forces had to continue as long as there were 
hostilities between China and Japan. Vice-admiral Oikawa, the commander-in-chief of the 
Japanese forces, stated bluntly that the attitude of the Chinese in carrying on their "stubborn 
resistance" was the reason for the Yangzi not being opened to general trade26. All protests 
notwithstanding, the Japanese had a full control of the situation and they were not prepared to 
give up their privileged access to the resources of Central China27. On the opposite, they were 
organizing in a way to exclude all third-country competitors from the region.  
 
In the course of 1939, the ADB Liaison bureau created several federations to take care of the 
supply of certain essential commodities like coal (Shanhai baidan kumiai/Shanghai meitan zuhe), 
non-ferrous metals (Kachû hikinzoku kumiai/Huazhong feijinshu zuhe), steel (Kachû kôtetsu 
tôsei kyôgikai/Huazhong gangtie tongzhi xieyihui), wood (Kachû nihon mokuzai haikyû 
kumiai/Huazhong riben mucai peiji xieyihui), oil (Kachû sekiyu rengôkai/Huazhong shiyou 
lianhehui)28. The following year, the five organizations merged into one single Central China 
federation for the monopoly of essential commodities (Kachû jûyô busshi tôsei kumiai 
rengôkai/Huazhong zhongyao wuzi tongzhi zuhe lianhehui), with the explicit purpose of getting 
into the control of not just trade, but also local manufacturing29. In September 1939, a new 
regulation defined new rules for exports from China, Manchukuo and the Guandong area30. In 
response to the new dispositions, the Japanese merchants organized 25 specialized companies. 
The following year, they formed the Central China federation of import and distribution 
companies (Kachû nihon yunyû haikyû kumiai rengôkai/Huazhong riben shuru peiji zuhe 
lianhehui)31. These organizations dealt in Japan-imported goods and took care of the trade 
between Japan, Manchukuo and Central China (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui). The Wuhan area had 
its own federation. All the Japanese firms in Shanghai (except banks, plants and maritime 
companies) joined the new federation. At the same period (September 1939), the Reformed 
government of Liang Hongzhi banned the export of various essential commodities like coal, 
minerals, scrap iron, non-ferrous metals, cotton, leather, lacquer, etc. Although the order applied 
only to locally produced goods the Japanese army required, this was the first expression of the 
measures of control (tongzhi) to come. 
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The geographical scope of the various organizations was actually limited to Shanghai and a few 
major cities in Central China. To make up for its lack of penetration into occupied territories, the 
Japanese established the Council for inland trade (Naichi tsûshô kankai kyôgigai/Neidi fanmai 
xieyihui) in autumn 1940. It was entrusted with the control on trade in goods of daily use 
(riyongpin/nichiyohin) in the occupied areas. Six other such councils were created for cotton cloth, 
sugar, metal products, matches, cooking oil, and soap32. The headquarters of the different 
councils were located in Shanghai. Other commodities like salt, rice, cigarettes, candles, beer were 
placed under the responsibility of a host of separate organizations. Silk, wool and paper products, 
however, came under military distribution companies (gunbai kumiai/junpei zuhe)33. No other 
company was allowed to deal in these products in the occupied territories. At the grass-root level, 
the Japanese also endeavored to implant their own organizations in the form of cooperatives. 
Such cooperatives were set up in each district; sub-cooperatives existed in towns and villages. 
The headquarters were in Shanghai. Even if officially they were under the command of the ADB, 
the cooperatives were closely watched over by the Japanese Special services. In the whole Central 
China area, there were 67 cooperatives and 602 sub-cooperatives with 891,875 members. They 
were active in the distribution of goods of daily use and the purchase of agricultural products34. 
 
The case of Shanghai continued to worry the Japanese military command. In the major industrial 
sectors, imports supplemented the decreasing supplies from Central China. The concentration of 
enormous amounts of capital supported the reconstruction of devastated plants or the 
establishment of new ones. With the districts north of Soochow creek under Japanese 
occupation, plant owners moved en masse to the foreign settlements, especially the western extra-
settlement area. The rapid development of industrial firms in this area caused a considerable 
concern among residents, most of them foreigners, who protested vehemently. Yet, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council took a sympathetic view of the need for Chinese entrepreneurs to re-establish 
their firms and provide employment to the population35. As a result, the city experienced a 
spectacular industrial and commercial boom in the 1938-1940 period36. The Japanese barriers 
notwithstanding, Shanghai continued to serve the war effort of the Chongqing-based nationalist 
regime. Through various channels, but mostly by smuggling along the Chinese coasts, Shanghai 
products found their way to inland China37. In April 1940, the Japanese military took an 
ordinance on the control of commodities (Busshi idô seigenrei/Wuzi yidong zhixian ling) in and 
out of the city. In February 1940, they founded the Central China Raw Cotton Association 
(Chûshi menka kyôkai/Zhongshi mianhua xiehui) to organize more systematically the purchase 
of raw cotton to supply the army and Japanese cotton mills38. From June 1940 onward, it applied 
increasingly stringent measures to place the movement of goods under strict surveillance39. 
Eventually, Shanghai became subject to an effective blockade. At the end of the year, the US 
consulate described the situation in the following terms: "a toll is being taken on all supplies of all 
categories moving to Shanghai from the interior, to the degree that this city has virtually the 
status of a rationed and heavily taxed concentration camp"40. 
 
From August 1940 onward, the Japanese also tightened their hold on the trade between occupied 
areas and nationalist areas while they endeavored to promote the use of military scrip. On the 
one hand, they set up a Trade Council (Hanbai kyôgikai/Fanmai xieyihui) whose mission was to 
prevent the export of cereals, textile, paper, chemical and dyeing products to inland China. The 
association was the preamble to a more elaborate system of associations designed to serve the 
needs of the Japanese army. On the other hand, the trade between China and Japan came under a 
more severe control. Commercial relations were strictly limited to the 25 companies (kumiai/zuhe) 
of the Central China federation of import and distribution companies (Kachû yunyû haikyû 
kumiai rengôkai). Chinese firms were excluded from this trade41. In October 1940, the Japanese 
imposed a similar regime for the trade in sugar, coal, oil, charcoal and matches in the Wuhan 
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area42. The control of foreign trade was only one part of the much larger net that the Japanese 
army was extending over Central China. It is safe to say that they lacked the proper resources to 
displace the Chinese merchants who had an intimate knowledge of the trade customs and 
circuits. Actually, the Japanese companies had to rely on the Chinese as they lack the human 
resources to cover a large region like Central China. The Chinese merchants in turn also worked 
for themselves and, despite the risks involved, made their own purchases and shipments of 
formally controlled commodities. Furthermore, smuggling became a flourishing activity in which 
the dominant players were companies set up by the various secret services43. Over time, 
however, the Japanese built up a series of specialized companies to take over the trade in the 
major commodities produced in the region.  
 
In May 1939, they had established the Central China federation of flourmills. It was concerned 
by the commerce of flour within Central China, but also with Manchuria, Japan, North and 
South China44. In March 1940, rice became the new target with the Central China company for 
the purchase of rice (Kachû beikoku shûbai kumiai/Huazhong migu shoumai zuhe). It included 
only Japanese merchants, especially the three large corporations like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Daimaru 
and another ten smaller companies. They purchased rice through Chinese intermediaries, but 
they were deemed to have a monopoly45. In winter 1940, the Shanghai branch of the Association 
of Japanese Cotton Mill-owners in China (Zaika nihon bôshoku dôgyôkai/Zaihua riben fangzhi 
tongyehui), the Japanese association of cotton, and two other Japanese Shanghai-based 
associations formed the Central China Raw Cotton Council (Chûshi menka kyôkai/Huazhong 
mianhua xieyihui). Its purpose was to enforce an exclusive control over the collect, purchase, 
transportation and transformation of cotton in Central China. The council had branches in 
Nanjing, Nantong, Qidong, Anqing Haimen, Hangzhou and Shanghai46. In spring 1941, the 
Japanese formed a Shanghai Japanese egg trade company. It started as a coordinating 
organization between egg traders, but it evolved into a monopoly agency (tongzhi jigou/tosei kiko). 
The company did not last long, for lack of funds. It was replaced by the Yangzi Egg Company. 
Several similar companies were established for fertilizer, bamboo, tea, hemp, etc. These products 
were collected in Central China for export to Japan47.  
 
Through these various companies, it became increasingly difficult to trade in most commodities 
that required permits to be moved from place to another. Stations were set up in strategic places 
under the control of the Special services. Each station adopted its own set of regulations. In the 
Shanghai area, the regulations were enacted by the consulate, then by the ADB. In winter 1940, 
the power of issuing regulations went back to the military headquarters. In September 1941, the 
Japanese army issued a major regulation on the movement of commodities in Central China48. 
These commodities could no longer be sent from Shanghai to Japan-occupied territories and vice 
versa without a permit. Furthermore, the transportation had to be entrusted to designated 
Japanese companies. The restrictions imposed by the Japanese on the movement of commodities 
made Shanghai increasingly dependent on imports. It also made the city more vulnerable to price 
hikes on international markets and, more fundamentally, on access to these markets to ensure the 
survival of its inhabitants and its industries. This is evident in the case of cereals — 200,000 tons 
of rice in the first quarter — which occupied the first place in Shanghai imports in May 1941. It 
relegated raw cotton to the second place with 40,000 tons. Most of these imports came from 
Asian countries (70 percent) due to the Asian rice and cotton producer's position as the leading 
suppliers of these commodities to Shanghai. Oil (60%) and sugar (55%) were imported from the 
Dutch Indies.49 
 
This system of control designed by the Japanese army guaranteed a virtual monopoly on trade to 
Japanese merchants in Central China. The extent of Japanese control can be measured with the 
case of the silk trade and production. The Central China Silk Company (Kachû sanshi 
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kôshi/Huazhong cansi gongsi) was set up on 10 August 1938 to carry out a comprehensive plan 
for establishing effective control of the silk industry in Central China. The move was reinforced 
by the decision of the ADB on 30 June 1939 to place all Chinese silk factories under the control 
and operation of the Central Silk Company. The latter also enjoyed an exclusive right to trade in 
raw silk. Although most Chinese factory owners had refused to be utilized and left their plants 
idle after the collapse of the Chinese armies, their factories were dragooned into the Japanese 
production system.  Eventually the company absorbed 21 Chinese filatures in Wuxi, Suzhou, 
Hangzhou, Haining, Jiaxing and Shanghai. In addition to the absorption of Chinese factories, the 
Central China Silk Company likewise established a monopoly over the production and purchase 
of cocoons and silkworm eggs. By the end of 1939, some 129 egg-raising farms had signed "co-
operation contracts" with the company. In 1940, it managed to obtain 1,701,000 piculs of 
cocoons50.  Shanghai was directly affected by the Japanese seizure of a large part of the Central 
China silk cocoons. Although most of its silk filatures were destroyed during the conflict, 19 of 
them resumed operation in spring 1938 and another 19 new ones were established in 1939. By 
the end of that year, there were 38 silk filatures in operation in the city with 6,754 reeling 
machines51. These filatures should have produced a total of 70,900 piculs of silk per year, but as a 
matter of fact, they produced only 20,000 piculs of silk in 1938 and 15,000 piculs in 1939. The 
main cause of poor working conditions of the filatures was the control of dried cocoons secured 
by the Central China Silk Company, one of the subsidiary companies of the Central China 
Development Company in the occupied areas of Central China52. 
 
The Japanese also imposed a system of permits on silk trade that applied to foreign merchants. It 
was rightly perceived by the US consulate as a move toward monopolization of the Shanghai silk 
export trade. Merchants could still import silk cocoons from non-Japanese controlled zones. 
They were smuggled from guerrilla-controlled areas, the parties paying “fees” at barriers en route 
— to Japanese guards or puppet Chinese police — thus getting the cocoons into Shanghai for 
reeling by local filature. The Japanese regarded this trade as “illegal” and sought to outlaw it by 
imposing regulations on exporters in Shanghai. Foreign exchange represented by each 
transaction was to be deposited in the Yokohama Bank. Statistics show that Japanese firms 
handled more than half this business, whereas prior to the hostilities only an insignificant portion 
of this trade was handled by these firms53. In March 1941, the China Weekly Review noted that the 
Chinese silk industry was facing slow strangulation under the rigid control of the Japanese 
monopoly organization, the Central China Silk Company. With few minor exceptions, only the 
filatures affiliated or cooperating with the Central China Silk Company were permitted to operate 
in the occupied regions54. The silk industry in Central China had been ruthlessly exploited and 
converted practically into a Japanese state enterprise55. 
 
The Japanese were also well aware of the enormous industrial potential in Central China. 
Whenever they could the Japanese confiscated the large industrial plants. They controlled or 
attempted to limit the access to primary materials from inland China at a time when imports 
from Europe had become more expensive because of war56. As in the past, careful surveys were 
made to assess the productive capacities in the various cities of the area (see table 1). The March 
1940 survey on which this table is based show a large number of plants, most of them, small 
ventures. It is a clear indication that, after the initial phase of fighting, Chinese entrepreneurs 
adapted to the new situation created by the Japanese occupation. Since many commodities could 
not be transported without permits, they established new plants near the places of production. 
This did not solve all their problems, as the prohibition increasingly applied to finished products 
(cotton cloth for example), but this strategy allowed them to maintain production57. This table 
also shows the centrality of Shanghai that, the occupation notwithstanding, was far from being 
challenged or displaced58. In the same survey, the Japanese ranked Chinese industrial cities 
according to a set of three indexes (table 2). This table reveals that out of 16 cities, nine were 
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located in Central China. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sent representatives to 56 foreign 
plants (textile, machines, tobacco, chemistry, wood and food) to take over management. By 1 
April 1942, the plants were under the control of the Asia Development Board. More than thirty 
were entrusted to Japanese companies for direct exploitation59. 
 
Nevertheless, the virtual monopoly of Japanese companies had numerous loopholes. Behind the 
formal organizations, there was a complex web of relations between the various partners 
involved in the game. We should not be misled into interpreting these various schemes as an iron 
grip on the economy of Central China. All the organizations notwithstanding, the Chinese 
merchants were able to trade in the controlled commodities. The creation of the military scrip, 
for instance, failed to solve the financial equation of the occupation. Since Chinese merchants 
had little confidence in the military scrip, they used to get rid of them as son as they could by 
purchasing Japanese goods for sale in China. Eventually this foiled Japanese plans to garner 
foreign currency through their foreign trade. By 1939, the Japanese trade surplus with China, 
Manchukuo reached 1054 million yuan, while the trade with third countries ran a deficit of 405 
million yen60. In November 1940, the Shanghai Mainichi, a Japanese daily newspaper reputed to be 
the organ of leading Japanese business and industrial interest in Shanghai, complained that the 
Japanese cotton mills were facing serious difficulties for lack of adequate supply. Chinese mills 
were said to have an advantage in their access to credit for the purchase of foreign cotton and 
their ability to smuggle Central China cotton into the city. Although the report sounded alarmist, 
the U.S. consulate did confirm that the Japanese mills had curtailed their operation by 40 percent. 
Their difficulties were not only on the supply side. On the sale side, the Japanese mills had lost 
the market in inland China, now under nationalist control, while the buying power in the 
Japanese controlled areas was impaired seriously as a result of the policies carried out by the 
Japanese authorities themselves61. 
 
With the war in Europe, it became increasingly difficult to import goods to China. Imports from 
Japan also decreased, which led the Japanese army to promote self-reliance in Central China. This 
in turn contributed to the transformation of the trade companies into companies concerned both 
with trade and production. There was already a move toward a greater involvement in the whole 
production process, including price fixing and rationing. It also implied a greater cooperation 
with Chinese merchants and their professional associations. As we have seen, however, there 
were many Japanese agencies involved in the import-export trade and the collect of material 
resources in Central China. These agencies were hardly coordinated and sometimes overlapped. 
The ADB Central China Liaison board did not cater to the practical organization of the 
commercial activities, while the Central China Development Company could at best monitor the 
concerns under its umbrella. In fact, the Japanese trade companies were competing in an almost 
free-for-all atmosphere that was hardly conducive to the systematic exploitation the army had 
envisioned. The need of coordination was not felt as long as the goods were delivered in 
reasonable quantities in an international context, which remained opened to Japan. When the 
international market contracted, Central China was perceived even more acutely the wealthiest 
pool of resources. The Japanese came to the conclusion that they could not seriously control the 
economy of the region without a more unified system. 
 
The beginning of the war in the Pacific led to a further reorganization of the Japanese organs in 
charge of economic activities in the lower Yangzi area. A new office designed to take care —
 actually to clear out — the properties of "enemy nationals". It was called Association for 
commercial relations in inland China (Chûgoku naichi tsûshô kankai kumiai/Zhongguo neidi 
tongshang guanxi zuhe). It branched out in all the surrounding cities and actually controlled all 
the organs (hanbai kyôgikai/fanmai xieyihui) responsible for the trade of commodities like cotton 
cloth (Kachû mensa fubiki hanbai kyôgikai/Huazhong miansha bupi fanmai xieyihui), sugar, 
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soap, matches, tobacco, silk, oil, etc. On top of this organization, the Japanese army also 
established an organ specifically designed to stabilize prices and promote the use of military scrip. 
The army and the Asia Development Board appointed the main leaders of these organizations62. 
Under this system, more than 30 organizations operated in the planning of the movement of 
goods. They belonged to two separate networks, one that was designed to collect commodities 
for export to Japan and another for the supply of Japanese firms in China. Production was 
divided in eight large categories, which included altogether 1040 products. Since this division of 
labor implied a large number of associations, a general association (tôsei kyôgikai/tongzhi xieyihui) 
controlled these activities through three distinctive organizations (kumiai/zuhe) for the 
production, the transportation, and the commercialization of the commodities in each category63. 
Through this elaborate structure, the Asia Development Board hoped to control the various 
steps of the economic process. Furthermore, the occupation of the International Settlement in 
Shanghai placed the Chinese merchant community at its disposal. 
 
After the Japanese takeover, it was no longer possible for the Chinese chamber of commerce to 
maintain its pro-Chongqing stance. The chamber underwent a process of reorganization for the 
second time in the nationalist era. The process was initiated in March 1941 under the guidance of 
a reorganization committee. It must have met with serious difficulties since it took 15 months to 
establish a new leadership with Yuan Lüdeng as chairman64. Beside the obvious economic 
advantages to be drawn from the reliance on Chinese networks, the move was made to press the 
Chinese merchants into collaboration with the occupiers. The Japanese initiated a forceful drive 
toward the establishment of all kinds of Sino-Japanese business organizations. In April 1942, the 
Japanese army entrusted the Asia Development Board with full control over the trade of 18 
commodities in the Shanghai area in order to unify the system of control of the economy. These 
commodities had to be traded through the channel of recognized Chinese (tongye gonghui) and 
Japanese (kumiai-zuhe) professional associations. The ADB ordered the establishment of 
professional associations for each category of products. Depending on their national affiliation, 
they were called "Central China Association for…" for the Japanese associations or "Sino-
Japanese Association for…" when they included Chinese and Japanese merchants 65. The new 
federations actually united the existing associations on both sides. Such Sino-Japanese 
associations (Sino-Japanese Federation of…) were established for the trade in tea, paper, coal, 
wood, metals, machines, dyeing products, medicine, wool and cotton textiles, etc66. On 15 
September 1942, the Japanese and Chinese authorities established a Central China monopoly 
committee for raw cotton (Kachû menka tôseikai/Huazhong mianhua tongzhihui) to take over 
the duties of the previous Japanese-controlled Central China Raw Cotton Association. The new 
committee was empowered to fix prices and organize the trade in raw cotton in the Shanghai 
area and the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui67. In 1942, the committee managed 
to purchase 175,407 piculs (dan) of cotton. 
 
The Japanese business community looked confidently at the new prospects offered by the 
occupation of the International settlement and the related elimination of western competitors in 
the region. It relieved them from the stalemate created in July 1941 by the freezing of Japanese 
assets by the United States and England and the subsequent economic blockade. Although trade 
relations remained affected, the Japanese businessmen expected a rapid development of trade 
relations with Shanghai's hinterland. Primary goods that were no longer available through 
imports would be compensated by local production. Cotton, rice, and silk ranked first in their 
concern. The de facto elimination of the fabi was seen as the first step toward a greater stability68. 
A May 1942 report bluntly stated that the Shanghai economy could not bounce back without 
resuming its relations with inland provinces. While it agreed on the absolute necessity to impose 
a system of control on the commodities required by the army, it insisted on the importance to 
maintain a reasonably sufficient level of supply to the population, including cereals for which it 
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proposed a loosening of the control system. The present organization, with its multiplicity of 
agencies, ran the whole system havoc. Furthermore, it was almost impossible in a city like 
Shanghai to make a reliable assessment of existing stocks of merchandise69. There were also 
attempts at redefining the place and role of Shanghai after its occupation by the Japanese army in 
the early months of 1942. A two-volume compilation of various reports argued that the city 
could be turned into a central base for the war effort in East Asia and the construction of the 
Sphere of co-prosperity. In a report on the general strategy, the authors pointed out Shanghai 
could meet the needs of the Japanese army in China and abroad. It could serve as a production 
center for the China/Japan/Manchukuo and the Southeast Asia theatres. It could also become 
the hub for the concentration of resources within the co-prosperity framework with a relaxation 
of the measures of control on the flow of goods. The seizure of the city withdrew considerable 
resources from the Chongqing regime and pushed it to bankruptcy70. This grand vision, 
however, failed to receive the proper attention of policy-makers, especially the military.  
 
In 1942, the Wang Jingwei government and the Japanese authorities established a Central Price 
Control Committee (Zhongyang wujia duice weiyuanhui/Chûô bukka taisaku i-inkai) with the 
purpose of carrying out a unified price policy throughout Central China. Each locality was to 
establish local committees71. In Shanghai, the overall control on commodities was entrusted to 
the Shanghai monopoly committee on material resources (Shanghai tebie shi wuzi tongzhi 
weiyuanhui)72. It included a large number of Japanese representatives from the army, the ADB, the 
special services and the consulate, but they almost never attended its meetings. From the minutes 
of its sessions between March and December 1942, one can hardly perceive any substantial 
activity. Most of the decisions relate to inquiries to Japanese merchants about some transactions, 
to the police of the bureau of Social affairs about suspected speculators, proposals for new 
prices, etc73. The minutes of the committee also reveal that its priority was not the collaboration 
with the Japanese. On its 9 May 1942 meeting, it decided to secretly send policemen to 
investigate how much merchandise the Japanese had seized. The committee gave secret 
instructions to the Chinese professional associations (tongye gonghui) to gather accurate statistics. 
Its purpose was to transfer these goods to the International settlement. With the Asia 
Development Board, it sought to obtain a low level for the quantities to be delivered74. This 
observation does not clean the Municipal government form its record of collaboration. It does 
show, however, that the Chinese municipality had its own agenda, that it gave a priority to its 
interests and that it sought to mobilize the Chinese organizations to limit Japanese ambitions. 
 
In January 1943, the committee was renamed Price control committee (Wujia duice weiyuanhui), 
following a national decision75. If the committee was conceived as a policy-making body for price 
control of major commodities in Shanghai, its record over six months looks very poor. 
Furthermore, despite the occupation of the International settlement by the Japanese, there was 
no coordination or contact neither with the SMC, nor with the French Concession. By August 
1942, the committee was still proposing to establish an organ of coordination with the Asia 
Development Board76 The committee was reorganized under the chairmanship of Xu Tianshen 
and renamed Committee for price assessment (Wujia pingyi weiyuanhui/Bukka kyôgi i-inkai) in 
December 194377. This followed an instruction by the central government. Its purpose was to 
overcome the "differences of opinion" (yijian bu yizhi) between central and local organs78. One 
can see this move as an attempt to take back the municipal organs' direct hold on commodities 
and have them focus on the regulation of prices. The incomplete set of minutes left in the 
archives show a small bureaucratic structure of 23 staff members. The committee members 
decided very early (March 1944) there was no need for regular meetings. Until mid-1944, the 
committee took little action, except examining applications for price increases, a task for which it 
was obviously understaffed79. When the municipal government expressed its concern about the 
continuing rise of prices and ordered the committee to stop it, the committee simply asked the 
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concerned organs to apply the official prices. When violations came to its knowledge, the 
committee asked the Bureau of economics to punish the culprits. The committee held its last 
meeting on 21 July 194580. 
 
By the end of 1942, it became obvious that the "semi" control system had failed. A Japanese 
observer wrote in late 1942 that for five years Shanghai had become the major battleground of 
the economic war that raged between the Japanese and the Chinese (Chongqing). Both sides 
were unable to win, but the stalemate had translated into the increasing enclosure of the city. 
Except for the Shanghai Municipal Council, neither side seemed to have cared about the 
nurturing and reconstruction of Shanghai. Worse, the system of permits for the transportation 
and sale of most commodities had created separate economic spheres. Even the Wuhan region 
was disconnected from the rest of Central China. Shanghai's hinterland had become fragmented 
into small fiefs. Shanghai had lived on imports from abroad — which allowed for an artificial 
boom and undue profits — but this privileged had vanished after mid-1941. It was now time to 
address the real issues: Shanghai was crucial for Central China and Central China was crucial for 
the Sphere of co-prosperity. If both went bankrupt, it would have adverse effect on both the 
economic and military fronts. The author stated there was no other way than resuming the free 
flow of commodities with the Central China region, between that region and North China, and 
even the Chongqing-controlled provinces. Limitations and controls should apply to military 
related commodities, but the rest should circulate freely. The Chinese merchants had enormous 
capital there was no way to control or harness for official plans. The official control systems had 
been turned into mechanisms for profit-seeking merchants. Ordinary people did not receive any 
benefit, either in terms of supply or in terms of lower prices. Official bureaucrats could not 
possibly make the system work. It was a dismal failure81. 
 
With the military occupation of Central China, Japanese merchants were given a clear advantage. 
They had to operate under the strict control of the Japanese special services or sometimes along 
with companies set up by these services. There was a de facto control of trade by the Japanese 
army, but this control was not yet formalized under a regime of monopoly agencies. Moreover, 
the control system up 1942 remained by and large concerned by the physical collection and 
transportation of material resources. The companies were not involved in a specific policy of 
fixed prices, even if they probably forced prices down and made a large use of the "free" military 
scrip to pay for their purchases. They were even less concerned by the process of production 
itself, even if they were sometimes implicated in the various stages of production of some 
commodities like silk. This was the exception rather than the rule. On the whole, the Japanese 
enforced an unsystematic policy in the industrial realm. They concentrated on primary materials 
with which they could supply their armies in Central China, but also in other parts of occupied 
China. They also shipped large quantities of these resources to Japan to supply their own 
population. We have seen that the number of major actors involved (army, ADB, embassy and 
consulate) translated into a multiplication and overlapping of trade and economic agencies with 
little coordination between them. Finally, the Japanese army also tried to stifle the Shanghai 
power engine. When they eventually took it over, they failed to understand the prerequisites of its 
success. The embryonic system of monopoly the Japanese had implemented in the previous years 
was developed into a full-blown system of monopolies. Its severity combined to the 
incompetence and corruption of its initiators sealed the decline of Shanghai and Central China. 
 
 
From one player to two players: Japan and the Wang Jingwei regime (1942-
1945) 
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In the course of 1942, the Japanese government was confronted to new challenges. Its conquest 
of Southeast Asia and the war with the United States required a full mobilization of the resources 
available. Because the embassy and the army-controlled Asia Development Board supervised the 
implementation of economic control, there were inevitable frictions and inconsistencies. In 1942, 
the Japanese government created the Greater East Asia Ministry (Dai toashô) with the purpose 
of unifying its political, economic and cultural action in occupied territories. In China, the 
ministry of Greater East Asia shifted the balance in favor of the embassy. The new ministry had 
its own instrument of control through the Trade corporation (Kôeki eidan/Jiaoyi yingtuan), a body 
that, supposedly, was to have overall control over trade and the storage of important 
commodities within the Greater East Asia region82. Yet, with trade becoming more difficult with 
Italy and Germany, with communications with Vietnam and Thailand more problematic, China 
actually became the major, if not unique, target of Japanese trade. The Trade corporation 
absorbed the previous committees in charge of trade (bôeki tôseikai/maoyi tongzhihui) and essential 
commodities (jûyô busshi kanri eidan/zhongyao wuzi guanli yingtuan) respectively. The 50-odd 
monopoly organizations (tongzhi tuanti) became solely inspection agencies. 
 
The Japanese cabinet also came to realize that it had to give some substance to its discourse on 
collaboration with its Asian allies, especially China. The Japanese authorities could not press the 
Wang Jingwei regime into declaring the war to the Allied forces without making some 
concessions on the political and economic front and partially accommodating Chinese claims on 
their sovereignty. The Chinese government had until then hardly played a significant role in the 
Central China region. The key player remained the Japanese army and its public and private 
subsidiaries83. In spring 1943, the Japanese adopted a "New policy toward China". According to 
this new agenda, the Japanese gave up its extraterritorial privileges in China, including its 
settlements. The fate of the Shanghai foreign settlements was therefore sealed. There was 
nothing to prevent their take over by the  Wang Jingwei government. The latter was also given 
more actual powers over the economy. Confiscated companies had to be returned to their 
original owners. Finally, after months of negotiations, Tokyo and Nanking signed an alliance 
treaty on 30 October 1943. With the transfer of various prerogatives and powers to the Chinese 
authorities, the Wang regime was able to assert itself on the economic stage. The introduction of 
a new player at a time when both the Japanese and the Chinese had decided to march toward a 
full blown "controlled economy" (tongzhi jingji) actually increased the potential for disorganization 
and confusion.  
 
Up to 1943, there was no unique institution in charge of monitoring the economic system, no 
network of inter-related agencies, only the juxtaposition of separate and often competing organs. 
The transfer of Japanese powers of control over the economic system in Central China was 
gradual and it came with a price. Restrictive measures were imposed on the commerce of rice in 
the lower Yangzi area. In March 1943 (13/3/1943), all movements of rice within and outside of 
each province, including the Nanking and Shanghai areas (but not the city proper) came under a 
system of certificates. The peasants had to deliver their harvest to the village authorities or to the 
closest administrative center. They had to bear the cost of transportation84. In spring 1943, the 
High Security Council of the Chinese government adopted a regulation on commodities that 
looked very much like the text issued by the Japanese army in September 1941. It bore exactly 
the same name and apart from a few minor details, it included the same dispositions85. The only 
real difference was that Chinese merchants had to obtain their permits from the Chinese 
authorities, while the Japanese merchants continued to obtain theirs from the Japanese consulate. 
For the export trade, however, the Japanese maintained their monopoly. To unify the 
organizations involved in the import-export trade between China and Japan, the Japanese 
initiated the establishment of a Sino-Japanese trade association (Zhong-Ri shangye xiehui/Chû-
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Nichi shogyô kyôkai) on 1 July 1943. Its actual domain, however, was restricted to central 
China86. 
 
The Japanese made a significant effort to give face to the Wang Jingwei regime with the 
surrender of confiscated properties since 1937 or 1941. They included plants, official buildings, 
schools, etc. Large numbers were turned over to the Chinese authorities after protracted 
negotiations. By March 1943, the Japanese had returned 1029 properties (around thirty in 
Shanghai)87. Most of them, however, were buildings of educational, religious and cultural 
institutions. And most of them were previously foreign-owned properties. The Japanese still 
retained the most valuable properties, namely industrial plants, especially in Shanghai88. The 1943 
treaty marked the beginning of a process of transfer of industrial companies under Japanese 
management to the Chinese authorities. The retrocession started with the companies confiscated 
from "enemy nationals" (52 companies) and the lifting of military control over postal services89. 
The transfer also included Sino-Japanese companies set up under the Central China 
Development Company. The Central China Salt Company (Kachû engyô kôshi/Huazhong yanye 
gongsi) and the Central China Silk Company  were both dissolved90. The other concerns of the 
company were also supposed to disappear or to be transferred to the Chinese authorities, but by 
December 1943 nothing had been accomplished91. There is no mention of these companies in 
later publications. Altogether, even if most plants were returned to the Chinese, sometimes with 
a financial compensation, the data show that the Japanese army kept for itself a core group of 
industrial plants until the end of the war. 
 
In other words, the Wang Jingwei government had to tread a careful path between its own 
ambitions, the demands from the Chinese business community, the needs of the population and 
the overarching presence of the Japanese military. In Central China, as noted above, the Chinese 
government stepped into the Japanese army's footsteps and began to implement a system of rigid 
controls over the economy. Yet it lacked both the will and the capacity to design the required 
institutions. Even in a place like Shanghai, fragmentation prevailed. After the takeover of the 
foreign settlements in mid-1943, each area preserved its institutions and rationing programs 
without the least regard for what was being done in the adjacent districts. The Chinese 
municipality did not absorb the former foreign enclaves until late 1944. The Japanese had failed 
in their attempt to elaborate of a system of control because they lacked the human resources and 
because they were unable to utilize the Chinese business community. They had pressed some of 
them to participate to the "Sino-Japanese federations" of various kinds created in the aftermath 
of Pearl Harbor, but the merchants generally kept a low profile. The Wang Jingwei regime 
offered a more palatable alternative, despite its clear collaborationist character. A Japanese 
journal went as far as stating that the merchant community had now come to terms with the 
"national government" and participated to the organizations of the regime92. This optimistic 
assessment notwithstanding, there was a definite change after Pearl Harbor as it became just 
impossible to do business without committing oneself to the regime's policies and agencies. As a 
result of more pressures or for sheer opportunism, the Chinese professional associations were 
drawn into the system of committees established to monitor the economy. Their leader could no 
longer avoid a direct participation to the official programs and to enter into some form of 
collaboration with the Wang Jingwei regime. Members of the Shanghai bourgeoisie like Tang 
Shoumin or Wu Zhenxiu made clear gestures of support as the representatives of the Shanghai 
business community and paid visits to Wang Jingwei in Nanking to discuss economic issues93. 
 
The economic policy and institutions the Wang Jingwei government adopted were a 
transposition of the system implemented in Japan since the beginning of the war. The state took 
over the control of the production and distribution of commodities for the sake of savings, 
rationality and military priorities94. The Japanese sought too implement such a system in China 
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with the support of the Chinese authorities. The establishment of the National Association of 
Trade Monopoly [hereafter NATM] (Quanguo shangye tongzhi zonghui) on 15 March 1943 in 
Shanghai was meant to provide the government with such an instrument of monopolistic control 
and regulation over commercial transactions in the lower Yangzi area. Its duty was to monitor 
the economic system in relation with the professional associations (tongye gonghui)95. As it was 
conceived as a merchant organization, the NATM was composed of merchants. Tang Shoumin 
(general manager of the Bank of Communications) was appointed chairman of the NATM, while 
other well-known businessmen headed or filled the various NATM committees96. The NATM 
was given extensive executive and regulative powers under the actual control of the Ministry of 
industry. Actually, it took a whole year to organize the NATM, which prevented it to assume all 
its missions. Power conflicts and excessive bureaucratic interference by the ministries of food 
and industry slowed down the whole process. The ministry of food was clearly worried by the 
prospect of losing control to a merchant-run organization97. The central government also 
appointed a Review committee on material resources monopoly (Wuzi tongzhi shenyi 
weiyuanhui) in which the Japanese had a dominant role. Its main purpose was to supervise the 
NATM and make sure it mobilized the proper resources to enforce the system of control of 
commodities. Although the committee was based in Nanking, it also had a branch in Shanghai98. 
It was chaired by Zhou Fohai and its members were issued from the major ministries involved in 
the production and trade of commodities. The Japanese side included six representatives from 
the army and the diplomatic representation99. 
 
To make up for the initial deficiency of the NATM, specific committees were established for the 
major products to be brought under control: rice (miliang), flour (fenmai), beans and cereals 
(youliang)100, cotton (mianhua), and daily necessities (riyongpin)101. The Cereal and Cotton 
committees, established in October and November 1943 respectively, were autonomous 
committees, while the three other specialized committees (fenmai zhuanye weiyuanhui, youliang 
tongzhi weiyuanhui, riyongpin tongzhi weiyuanhui) remained part of the NATM organization. 
The NATM underwent a new reorganization in July 1944, which made all the committees 
autonomous. The NATM concentrated its action on policy-making and supervision of the 
committees102. The NATM became an organ for policy-making and supervision of the central 
and local committees as it was replicated at the local level through associations based on a district 
or a city103. It included both Japanese and Chinese merchant organizations. Between April and 
November 1943, the NATM organized 24 federations, 7 of them on a territorial basis and the 
other 17 by product. Altogether 566 professional associations (tongye gonghui) were placed under 
the umbrella of these federations and under the NATM. 11 professional associations represented 
the Japanese104. Yet, their presence in the various NATM committees was sometimes 
overwhelming. The Sugar monopoly committee was made up of a majority of Japanese, as well 
as that in charge of beans and other cereals. The Flour monopoly committee was almost split in 
half between Chinese and Japanese representatives105. Between April and September 1943, the 
NATM, the Ministry of food (Liangshibu) and the Ministry of industry separately or jointly 
enacted various regulations that defined the rules, the products and the areas that came under the 
new system of monopoly. On 18 April 1943, the ministry of food listed the cereals that now 
came under official control. The NATM promulgated regulations on 11 and 17 May 1943 which 
made registration compulsory for 25 products and banned their export from the three Yangzi 
provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui) without an export certificate to be issued by the NATM. 
The list included all cereals, metals, medicine, textiles, rubber, machinery, etc. The first nine 
products of the list were industrial goods for which a certificate also had to be issued by the 
military authorities. On 24 May 1943, a joint decree listed all the commodities that came under 
the fold of official control106. Another regulation banned hoarding and made the sale or the 
registration of stock with the professional associations (tongye gonghui) compulsory107. 
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Despite their privileged position in the NATM structure, the Japanese decided to establish the 
China Japanese Federation of Trade (Chûka Nihon bôeki rengôkai/Zhonghua riben maoyi 
lianhehui) in July 1943. Its purpose was to take over trade relations with Japan that until then had 
been in the hands of companies under military control (junpei zuhe). Unmistakenly, the Japanese 
got organized in order to form a united front vis-à-vis the NATM. The establishment of the 
China Japanese Federation of Trade (Zhonghua riben maoyi lianhehui) was also expected to 
solve the lack of unity among the various Japanese agencies. With around 800 members, 
including a whole set of previously military-controlled companies, the federation was placed 
under the strict control of the Japanese embassy. Its existence was enshrined in the Sino-Japanese 
treaty of 1943. The federation enjoyed a monopoly on Chinese imports and exports with 
Japan108. Its eight departments monitored cotton, sugar, food products, silk, chemicals, capital 
goods, and miscellaneous goods (zahuo/zakka). Actually, it included everything not covered by 
the single Central China federation for the monopoly of essential commodities (Kachû jûyô 
busshi tôsei kumiai rengôkai). The Federation monitored a group of 28 concerns involved in the 
Sino-Japanese trade109. The embassy gave strict instructions to ensure there would be no 
competition with the Central China Development Company. The Company for the distribution 
of scrip-purchased commodities (Gunpyô kôkan yôbusshi haikyû kumiai) and the Central china 
federation of import and distribution syndicates (Kachû yunyû haikyû kumiai rengôkai) were 
dissolved. The two agencies had been set up to limit the flow of goods from Central China to the 
Yen block areas, to monitor the imports from Japan, to defend the value of the military scrip, 
and challenge the official Chinese currency (fabi). The former had lost its purpose when the 
military scrip was abolished in April 1943110. The Japanese retained the Central China federation 
for the monopoly of essential commodities (Kachû jûyô busshi tôsei kumiai rengôkai). Because 
of the more sensitive nature of the goods it dealt with, the federation remained separate, though 
with a more limited scope. Finally, the various specialized councils (kyôgikai) established in 1940 
were absorbed by the NATM111.  
 
In Shanghai, the authorities had to deal with an increasingly complex and difficult economic 
situation. The city had lost its access to overseas markets after Pearl Harbor and it was still cut 
off from regular and adequate supply sources in Central China. Various municipal documents 
testify to the attempt by the municipality to control the circulation of a wide range of products 
between Shanghai and other cities. Registered products had to be accompanied with a certificate 
issued by the municipal services of the NATM (1943)112. The municipality was also confronted 
to the issue of coordinating its services. The municipal government established a Bureau of 
economic affairs (jingjiju) on 1 March 1943. Its predecessor, the Bureau of social affairs (shehuiju) 
lost its prerogatives on economic issues and was turned into an agency for social welfare (shehui 
fuliju). The Bureau of economic affairs was to oversee and monitor the local economy. The 
municipal government was clearly worried by the number of organs from the central 
government, not to mention the Japanese agencies actively involved in the monitoring of 
business in the metropolis113. The bureau immediately set itself to the task of reorganizing all the 
professional associations (gongye tonghui) on which the controlled economy relied. This ambition 
met with a lot of difficulties related to the overlapping of business domains and the complexity 
of the associations114. By mid-November 1943, the bureau had reorganized 117 professional 
associations. Industrial plants, shops and companies had to register with the new bureau. While 
its drive was successful in the Chinese municipality, it met with little success in the foreign 
settlements (only 20 percent registered), despite their formal takeover during the summer of 
1943115. Actually, the bureau was never able to impose its control over the former settlements116. 
 
All measures of control notwithstanding, Chinese merchants found ways to evade the carefully 
designed takeover of production and commercialization by the state. Sometimes, they challenged 
the system in quite an overt manner. In July 1942, the police sent plain-cloth inspectors to the 
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Cotton Yarn Association (630 members), whose chairman was Wen Lanting: "they found the 
place overcrowded with hundreds of people and business being conducted on the premises as 
usual in disregard of the [SM] Council's notification". The association received an official 
warning117. One week later, a new inspection revealed that things had hardly changed, but the 
association was more careful. The premises were open for one hour only (9:30-10:30 a.m.) and 
the members were asked to carry all their transactions orally. They did not sign contracts… 
appended no signatures or chops to indicate the parties concerned118. The association argued 
that it did not allow any business transactions, but that it had rented out two floors to a private 
individual on whose activities the association had no control. One month later, the plain-cloth 
inspectors made the same observation: "there were crowds of people standing in the alleyway of 
Tung Wo Li [seat of the association] and along the pavement on either side of Tientsin road… 
the front door was closed all the time, though its back door was always left open. The brokers, 
consequently, were given free access to the building to use telephone connections"119. 
 
In April 1943, Wang Jingwei gave orders to the vice-minister of industry, Yuan Yuquan and the 
vice-minister of finance, Chen Zhisuo, to carry out a thorough inspection of hoarding practices 
in Shanghai. There was an initial drive of four days during which inspectors stormed banks, 
insurance and enterprise holding (qiye gongsi) companies to verify their accounting books. Yet, 
after four days, the drive came to a complete stop. The report published later singled out a few 
companies, which were caught with concealed stocks of unregistered commodities. The minister 
of industry, Si Meiping had also tried his hands weeks before and had uncovered 30 million 
worth of unregistered stocks in bank-owned go-downs. It is obvious that protests came from the 
business circles and that their close links with government circles allowed them to have the 
inspection drive suspended. On the issue of hoarding, Japanese business circles made it plain that 
they saw the root of the problem in the intermingling of political and business circles in China120. 
This allowed unscrupulous institutions to take advantage of their relations to escape inquiries and 
punishment. The Wang Jingwei government, who badly needed the support of Chinese 
economic elites, especially the Shanghai bourgeoisie, had to make do with these unsavory 
practices. Both were involved in a fool's game. On 19 June 1943, a more permanent structure, 
the Shanghai Committee of inquiry on material resources (Shanghai wuzi diaocha weiyuanhui) 
was established with Chen Gongbo at its head121. It was composed of representatives of the 
municipal government, the former Shanghai Municipal Council, the Japanese embassy and 
consulate, the Kempeitai, etc. Its mission was to investigate public and private go-downs in 
search of hidden stocks, especially in cotton cloth122. Actual control was left to the police, but it 
targeted only small merchants. 
 
The takeover of the management of the economy by Nanking had contributed to a greater 
disorganization. Japanese police reports reveal the extent of the confusion created by the 
retrocession of the foreign settlements and the clumsy implementation of economic controls. 
The small Japanese merchants were suffering more because the system worked to the advantage 
of the Chinese merchants. A report noted that the Japanese merchants had had five golden years, 
but that mounting difficulties would lead to the departure of a good number of them (up to one 
third). Furthermore, the report accused the authorities in Nanking of seeking quite deliberately to 
undermine Japanese interests with unavoidable conflicts123. As we shall see with the case of 
cotton, the entire system was economically counterproductive, highly inefficient and extremely 
corrupted. The agencies in charge of the control of commodities were at the forefront of 
speculation and the hoarding of goods. Shanghai industries collapsed. In February 1944, the city 
had 4607 plants, but only 2910 were in operation. More than one-third (37%) of the industrial 
capacity was idle. One year before, there were 3772 plants, but 2920 were in operation. An 
increasing number of plants were forced to close down124. These figures, however, reflect only 
one part of the problem because most plants used only a very small part of their productive 
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capacity. Although many saw the phasing out of the restrictions on the movement of goods as 
the only way to get out of the situation of crisis generated by the system of controlled economy, 
actual development and policies took the opposite direction125. The establishment of new 
industrial firms was not an indicator of an industrial revival. It often was no more than a 
disguised way of obtaining primary materials to be sold on the black market126. Added to the 
unrestrained issuing of paper money, the economy could only take another downturn. 
 
The occupation of the International Settlement and the severance of commercial relations abroad 
led to a serious crisis in coal supply. The Japanese-dominated SMC asked industrial plants about 
their minimum needs127. On 18 February 1942, the Japanese ordered the 16 Chinese wholesale 
dealers to merge under the aegis of a single company, the Dazhong coal general store (Dazhong 
lianmeihao). The general store controlled two thirds of the coal distributed in the city128. The 
professional association of coal briquettes (Meiqiu tongye gonghui) distributed the rest, at the 
same price and with the same profit margin as the General store. As in the case of cotton cloth, 
more than one half of the original coal stores (511) were wiped out by the monopoly system129. 
The remaining stores complained about the illegal practices of the General store, which abused 
its position of monopoly to increase its margins. The coal merchants sent an official protest to 
the Japanese authorities. The monopoly was maintained. The General store and the professional 
association imported 2000-3000 tons of coal daily130. This level was much below the basic 
requirements of the city's population and industries. Between 1933 and 1937, the average 
consumption of the whole city reached 3,5 million tons every year131. With the slowing down of 
industrial activity, the needs of the city in early 1944 declined to one million tons per year, but 
actual supply hardly reached 600,000 tons132. The price of coal, although it increased like other 
commodities, was fairly reasonable in 1941 and 1942 [according to the journal]. After November 
1943, however, prices flared up as the production of coal briquettes sharply declined. Even with 
a ration limited to five yuan of coal briquettes per person, coal dealers did not have enough to 
serve the population. A plant, which received rationed coal to produce coal briquettes, managed 
to lower the actual content in coal to 20 percent whereas the regulations fixed a minimum of 50 
per cent. The plant was closed down133. The lack of coal caused a sharp decline in the production 
of electricity. The quantity of electricity provided to industrial plants was reduced to 60 percent 
of their average consumption during the previous term (July-September 1943). It had devastating 
effects since the summer term was a slack season for most plants. Therefore, the basis of 
calculation meant a drastic reduction of the quantity of electricity they actually needed134.  
 
In February 1944, Zhongguo jingji (The Chinese economy) presented a summary of the past year's 
achievements by the government. It painted a rather negative portrait: "The progressive 
reinforcement of the controlled economy by the authorities is one thing, but for the controlled 
economy to reach its ideals is another matter. In reality, in the course of last year, from the 
perspective of the development of the economy of Central China, [we can see that] prices rose 
tremendously, production is paralyzed, the life of the people and productive activities have not 
only failed to improve as a result of the controlled economy, but on the opposite it has become 
worse then ever"135. The journal pointed out the prerequisites for the successful implementation 
of a system of controlled economy (tongzhi jingji): it should apply to the whole country; it should 
apply to the whole economic process, from production to consumer sales; the agencies in charge 
of the controlled economy should be unified; the policy of control should be rational and 
enlightened. In the light of these criteria, the present system was extremely deficient: the 
government was unable to reach into the Chinese countryside and agricultural economy; because 
of that, the control system was partial and piecemeal; there was a plethora of organizations 
without a unified command system and overlapping or contradictory powers; this system 
required skills that were missing among those in charge of the system136. The journal summed up 
the major consequences of the control system. The industrial activity in the cities of Central 
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China kept contracting. The compulsory purchase policy of agricultural products at low prices 
had pushed the peasants to reduce their production. The official control on major commodities 
had stopped the free flow of goods between the cities and the countryside, while the rationing 
system was unable to deliver these commodities to the population, causing high prices on both 
sides. Since production offered no regular outlets, capital turned to increasingly speculative 
activities. The end result was the development of a black market that actually served to regulate 
the system, though at a high price which many people could not afford (Table 4). The black 
market itself reinforced the tendencies toward hoarding and speculation for the sake of pushing 
up prices137. Hoarding was also perceived by the Japanese business community as the main 
"cancer" that sapped the Chinese economy138. 
 
Wang Jingwei declared 1944 as the "Year of increased production" (zengchan nian). It called for 
the mobilization of all energies from all sectors of society. The people were asked to stop "idly 
look around and shake their head in despair" (xiushou pangguan, yaotou taixi) and to "step into 
reality and take action" (jiaota shidi qu zuo). In March 1944, a group of merchants strongly 
involved with the Wang regime initiated a new association, Zhongguo shiye xiehui (Association 
of Chinese Industry) to promote and encourage industrial production. Although its chart was 
submitted to the municipality for approval, nothing concrete ever came out from this attempt139. 
Zhongguo jingji sternly reminded the authorities that what they perceived as idleness and lack of 
initiative were in reality the products of the exclusion of capital, labor and time from the process 
of production. The government would be well inspired to "step into reality" to solve these 
issues140. It also observed that it was illusory to try to catch or concentrate idle capital as long as 
there was no real investment opportunities to turn this floating capital into productive 
ventures141. In the course of the year, it became apparent that production was not only 
increasing, but continued to decline. On 1 September 1944, the government belatedly established 
a Central China Production Enhancement Board (Huazhong shengchan zengqiang benbu). Its 
mission was to serve as a coordinating agency for the various monopoly organizations that 
operated in the region142. It could only create even more confusion. The new board must have 
had a limited impact, as its name does not appear in later documents.  
 
The tongzhi jingji in action: the case of cotton goods 
 
Cotton was certainly the major agricultural product in Central China for industrial purposes. 
Shanghai had emerged over the centuries as the region's major cotton trade center143. With the 
development of modern industry, the city also became China's stronghold for the production of 
cotton yarn and cloth. The cotton industry also developed in several cities of Central China. The 
war and the blockade imposed on the movement of goods even generated the establishment of a 
large number of small-scale industrial ventures out of Shanghai. Yet, their level of technology 
and output were far below that of the metropolis' more advanced plants. In the initial phase of 
the war, the city's industries had to rely on imports to compensate the diminishing flow of raw 
cotton that came from Central China. Up to Pearl Harbor, cotton ranked first or second in 
Chinese imports. The other "competing" commodity in customs statistics was obviously rice. 
The Japanese firms were supplied with Central China raw cotton through the trade companies of 
the CCDC or the ADB. Nevertheless, they sometimes suffered from high prices or even lack of 
supply when cotton was shipped to Japan or North China. Even if they complained bitterly, 
accusing Chinese mill owners from undue advantages, the Japanese mills made huge profits until 
1942144. Furthermore, the Japanese army had confiscated the Chinese mills in the Chinese 
municipality and transferred the management to Japanese companies. All the other Chinese 
plants either processed smuggled cotton from Central China or imported cotton. After 
December 1941, however, the Chinese plants came under Japanese control in a city cut off from 
its overseas links. Cotton mills and filatures depended on the Japanese trade companies. 
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In Central China, trade in raw cotton was in the hands of the Central China Cotton Association 
(Kachû menka kyôkai). The association used to enjoy a monopoly over the purchase of cotton 
flowers and the power to fix prices. The various local sections made all the purchases from the 
peasants. The cotton was then centralized at the upper level, the main area section, which 
transferred them to the headquarters of the CCCA in Shanghai. The CCCA distributed the 
cotton to industrial plants. Between 1938 and 1940, the CCCA had limited competitors, since the 
Shanghai-based cotton mills had access to the international market and imported large quantities 
of raw cotton from British India. The Chinese merchants were also purchasing raw cotton, but 
their ability to challenge the Japanese was seriously constrained by the controls of the Japanese 
army on the trade routes. When the situation deteriorated, however, the monopoly privileges of 
the Japanese association could not ensure it could reach its objectives. A report indicates that the 
harvest of 1941 was much below previous year — from 3 million piculs (dan) to 1,3 million 
piculs. The prices on the black market went up so high that the association failed to achieve its 
goal of purchasing 500,000 piculs (dan) of cotton. Failing this, it imposed forced purchases. In 
October 1941, the association held a meeting to decide on its general drive to purchase cotton 
for the coming year145. We have no data on the degree of success of the 1942 campaign, but we 
know that since production continued to decline, collection must have been below the set 
objectives. Furthermore, the Chinese merchants and industrialists had no alternative, but to turn 
to Central China to purchase as much cotton as possible, since the international markets were 
now closed. 
 
The increasing tension on cotton supply in Central China and in Shanghai led the Japanese and 
the Wang Jingwei government to enforce a more stringent set of policies. Cotton mills and 
filatures were in dire straits and the price of cotton goods was getting out of hand. The 
government declared that the purchase of cotton and other industrial goods in the city and that 
of various agricultural products in the countryside would allow the authorities to guarantee an 
adequate supply of goods to the population on both sides through a barter system146. Reverting 
to such a system could hardly be seen as a progress for the Lower Yangzi area, the most 
commercialized part of the country for centuries. In August 1943, the Japanese sealed all stocks 
of cotton cloth and yarn throughout Central China. The owners were ordered to sell their goods 
at fixed prices, but they received only one fourth or one sixth of this amount in cash. While it 
was fairly easy to identify existing stocks in small cities, it was a real challenge to do the same in 
Shanghai. 
 
To enforce the new regulation, the NATM established on 17 August 1943 a Cotton Cloth and 
Purchase Bureau (Shoumai miansha mianbu banshichu) with Nie Lusheng, the chairman of the 
Federation of cotton goods (Mianzhipin lianhehui) at its head. Nie was the director of a small 
filature, but he was also a friend of Tang Shoumin, the influential chairman of the NATM. The 
other members of the bureau were also transfers from the NATM147. In November, the bureau 
was renamed Office for the management of cotton (Mianye guanlichu)148. In Shanghai, all cotton 
cloth and yarn had to be registered with the committee before 6 September 1943. The bureau 
started collecting the declared stocks in late September. Payment to the original owners was 
made within five months149. Among the Japanese merchants, the purchase of cotton stocks was 
made by the provisional management office for cotton of the Central China Federation of Trade 
(Huazhong maoyi lianhehui linshi shabu guanli shiwuju). The police put the figures of current 
stock at 600,000 bao, of which one third is in Japanese hands and the rest in Chinese hands150. 
Another report observed that whereas the official records showed stocks at 523,526 bao, the real 
quantity hoarded in the city amounted to one million bao151. The police was quite pessimistic on 
the prospect of collecting the stocks of cotton goods: the authorities would be able to retrieve 95 
per cent of the Japanese stocks, but only 60 percent of the Chinese ones. The Chinese merchants 
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were said to resort to all kinds of corruptive practices to avoid the compulsory purchase of their 
goods152. Eventually, the bureau collected 210,000 bao from Japanese merchants and 250,000 bao 
from Chinese concerns. The total — 460,000 bao — was 100,000 bao short of the lower level of 
identified stocks in the city153. The missing goods must have been diverted for sale on the black 
market or for hoarding. While the rationale of the compulsory purchase scheme — forcing prices 
down — provoked a temporary softening of prices, in the long run, it generated a worsening of 
the situation. 
 
The purchase of cotton cloth and yarn was based on a reference price for one product. Actually, 
the operation was very complex because there were all kinds of cotton cloth and yarn. A special 
committee was established to prepare a table of the various types of products. Altogether, there 
were more than 77 different types of cotton cloth and 46 different categories of cotton yarn154. 
The reference price of cotton yarn was set at 10,000 yuan for one bao and that of cotton cloth at 
375 yuan for one pi (bolt)155. At current black market prices, the total stock was worth 24,1 
billion yuan, or 40,000 yuan per bao. The missing 100,000 bao represented a capital of 4 billion 
yuan. What the bureau actually did was to purchase the cotton stock at 25 percent of their value 
on the black market156. One can imagine the impact of the measure of compulsory purchase. To 
make things worse, the payment method could hardly encourage cotton owners to deliver their 
goods. One half of the cotton was to be paid in cash at the time of purchase. But payment was 
made in cash in two installments, the first one three months after the purchase was made and the 
second one within a year. The rest would be paid in three installments over a period of three 
years. Furthermore actual payment was delayed because the bureau required a five-month delay 
to process the purchased cotton, examine its quality and ask the Central Reserve Bank to pay the 
original owner157. In the context of hyperinflation that was developing by then, this meant cotton 
owners would hardly receive any compensation for the cotton they had sold to the government. 
Although no one can deny that many of them had made good money in the preceding years, 
taking advantage of the situation of scarcity created by the Japanese — a situation for which the 
merchants were not responsible — the compulsory purchase of cotton goods under these harsh 
conditions was nothing less than an outright spoliation. No doubt that more than one cotton 
owner tried to hide at least one part of its stocks. Those that suffered most were the smaller 
shops. 
 
Compulsory purchase had an immediate effect on prices. The price for one bao dropped almost 
overnight from 38,000 yuan to 28,000 yuan. Many firms just went bankrupt: 600 cotton yarn 
shops out of a total of 800, 2000 cotton cloth shops out of a total of 2600, more than one half of 
the small cotton spinning mills (mianbuchang)158. The large cotton cloth shops fired one half of 
their staff through a lottery system after the adoption of the compulsory purchase system159. The 
system of compulsory purchase of cotton cloth enforced at the beginning of August 1943 
(9/8/1943) generated vocal protest by Shanghai industrialists. Pan Xusheng, the chairman of the 
professional association of cotton industrialists (Shanghai shi buchang tongye gonghui) went to 
Nanking to negotiate the postponement of the new policy. He encountered a straight rebuttal160. 
Wen Lanting also attempted to plead their case with Wang Jingwei during one of the latter's visit 
to Shanghai. But Wang refused to commit himself to a revision of the system. The police report 
argues that Shanghai industrialists had made enormous profits in the three preceding years and 
that they were now speculating on cotton rather than producing cotton cloth161. Cotton mill 
owners met on 13 November 1943 to examine their current difficulties in supplying their plants 
with raw cotton and to prepare a document of protest for the NATM. Each company was asked 
to provide its current level of production, the state of its stocks, the level of sales and the average 
level of production over the last six months. The last figure was to be proposed as the reference 
for the distribution of raw cotton by the NATM162. The cotton filatures came to a complete 
standstill. While the authorities were purchasing cotton, the distribution system was not in place. 
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The plants had to wait for the government to allocate cotton to start production. By October 
1943, plants were still idle163. In December, no shop, no cotton filature, no cotton mill had 
received any quantity of raw cotton, or cotton yarn or cotton cloth164. 
 
The inefficiency of the compulsory purchase of cotton — or deliberate action of those in control 
of the committee and involved in the trade of cotton — exacerbated speculation and price 
increases, while the population was simply left out. Between August 1943 and the end of the war, 
the committee managed to implement only one distribution of cotton cloth at the low official 
price165. The largest part of the collected cotton either remained idle in the committee's go-
downs, while some of it found its way to the black market. In actually freezing a large volume of 
cotton out of the market, the committee directly contributed to the sharp increase of the price of 
cotton goods on the black market and reinforced the advantage of those who possessed stocks to 
hoard and speculate. In another field, the restrictions imposed by the government created both 
limitations and opportunities, depending on which side of the barrier one was situated. In July 
1943, a Shanghai industrialist complained about the secretive procedures of the Society for the 
coordinated management of cloth shops (Buhaoye lianyingshe). The society dealt in cotton cloth 
and dyeing. The fifteen members of the society were co-opted from the original professional 
associations (gonghui) in charge of these commodities. The industrialist denounced the practices 
of hoarding of both cloth and dyeing products, whereas one half of the dyeing plants had closed 
down. He observed that everybody was hoarding, including teachers, employees, etc. They all 
tried to make some money through speculation166. The compulsory purchase system failed to 
bring prices to a halt. Prices continued to rise in relation with the continued issuing of paper 
money and related debasement of the currency. Moreover, the actual freezing of cotton in the 
go-downs of the committee pushed prices further up. There was more money in circulation than 
goods in circulation167. 
 
The control system also applied to raw cotton. A Raw Cotton monopoly committee (Mianhua 
tongzhi weiyuanhui) came into existence in Shanghai on 27 November 1943. The committee did 
not belong to the NATM apparatus until it merged with the Office for the management of 
cotton in July 1944 under the combined name of Monopoly committee for cotton (Mianye 
tongzhi weiyuanhui)168. Wen Lanting and Tong Lüqing headed the committee169. It operated 
through the professional associations related to cotton, both Chinese and Japanese. The 
associations were grouped under the Association of raw cotton purchasing guilds (Mianhua 
shoumai tongye xiehui). The guilds in turn purchased raw cotton through local merchants. Apart 
from a share defined by the committee to be left for their own plants, the association was 
obligated to turn the entire surplus to the committee. The collected raw cotton was stored in go-
down in the major towns of the cotton-producing areas. No movement was allowed without the 
committee's permission. The committee set up a separate committee for cotton cloth produced 
in other parts of Central China (Mianshabu linshi guanli weiyuanhui)170.  
 
In 1943, the Association of raw cotton purchasing guilds (Mianhua shoumai tongye xiehui) 
targeted the purchase of 500,000 piculs (dan) of raw cotton. It was to be shared between the 
Japanese army (33 percent) and the Chinese and Japanese cotton filatures. The association met 
with two difficulties. The 1943 harvest was 40 percent below the level of the previous year as a 
result of bad weather in the preceding autumn and the peasants' decision to shy away from 
cotton171. The initial price range offered (2647-3307 yuan/catty), however, could only reinforce 
their preference for alternative solutions. The peasants cared for the better prices offered by the 
small workshops and plants scattered in the area. These small ventures escaped official control 
and easily competed with the large industrial plants of the major cities. Furthermore, the peasants 
received only one part of the money in cash and the rest in IOU's to be redeemed at a later time. 
In spring 1944, official prices were raised to 8000 yuan, then 9500 yuan, but inflation had already 
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taken its toll. Yet, the association managed to buy 400,000 piculs (dan) during the 1943-1944 
campaign. To avoid the competition created by the small workshops, the committee made the 
registration of all the firms with more than 800 spindles compulsory172. The policies of 
compulsory purchase below market price encouraged the peasants to give up the production of 
commodities like cotton. They shifted to rice or other products. Yet, even in the case of rice, the 
peasants were concerned about their own subsistence, but as in the case of cotton, they were not 
motivated in producing much since they had to sell their harvest to the monopoly agencies below 
market price173. The peasants also turned to selling their rice to private merchants who operated 
illegally and sold the rice to the black market. The culture of cotton was also impaired by the lack 
of fertilizers, either as a result of their official monopolies, or simply because they were too 
expensive for the peasants. As a consequence, production went down. In 1944, the whole 
agricultural economy of Central Chine was in crisis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
When the Japanese army launched its military campaign for the conquest of Central China, its 
leaders had hopes that a blitzkrieg would suffice to annihilate the Chinese forces and overthrow 
the Nationalist government. With such a scenario came a new Chinese leadership able and even 
eager to build a Japan-friendly regime. China would become Japan's political ally and, under a 
new division of labor, a major pool of resources for the Japanese economy. These expectations 
were beset by the staunch resistance of the Chinese armies around Shanghai and Nanking, the 
Nationalist government's refusal to capitulate and its ability to build a base for resistance in 
inland Sichuan. The Japanese army not only had to face increasing costs due to the extension of 
war in time and space, it also had to bear the huge burden of having to administer a huge country 
with limited human and economic resources. In the political as well as in the economic fields, the 
Japanese occupation was not viable without bringing the Chinese into the system. 
 
In Central China, the priorities of the Japanese army changed over time. It had a direct impact on 
its attitude toward the Chinese puppet authorities, business community, and local society at large. 
Between 1938 and 1945, the Japanese policy shifted from strategic considerations to economic 
considerations. In the early years of the occupation, the primary concern was to prevent the 
movement of commodities to Guomindang-controlled areas.  A successful blockade would bring 
the Nationalist regime to its knees. Within this larger concern, the Japanese army was willing to 
challenge the Western presence in Central China, especially in Shanghai where its economic and 
political power was concentrated.  On the one hand, the control on the supply of primary 
materials could strangle economic life in the city. On the other hand, the control on the means of 
transportation would prevent the movement of goods to their original inland markets. Besides 
this politically-inspired strategy, the Japanese army was prepared to rake off as many 
commodities as possible to supply its units throughout China and its population back home. 
 
The Japanese army could rely on a wide range of "brain trusts" and research center to design 
plans for a systematic exploitation of Central China's resources. Probably on too many of them. 
These agencies did their part of the job. They came up with serious plans based on careful 
surveys of existing resources.  These plans, however, came to nothing for two main reasons. 
First, the Japanese army had its own agenda, priorities, policies, etc. The plans, the studies, the 
opinions voiced in economic journals basically fell on deaf ears. Second, no overall blueprint was 
ever conceived for the Japanese occupation. It was by and large an improvised exercise all the 
way down to the 1945 surrender. This is especially visible in the succession of overlapping and 
sometimes competing  organizations and in the frequent changes in the regulations. Eventually, 
the Japanese army was able to plunder Central China's resources to its content, but without being 
able to really displace the Chinese merchants. Up to 1940, it is clear that Shanghai was still 
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receiving a substantial share of the agricultural products its industries and population needed. 
After 1940, however, because Japan was affected by the economic consequences of the war in 
Europe, it tightened its grip and dried the flow of goods to the city. 
 
This paper has established that the Japanese established all kinds of companies to carry out the 
collect of commodities in Central China. Most of these companies were actively staffed and run 
by the Shanghai-based Japanese private commercial, financial and industrial firms. These 
companies were deeply involved in the exploitation of Central China's resources thanks to the 
privileges they enjoyed as a result of military occupation. The first circle of collaboration was 
there, in the genuine complicity of Japanese private concerns with the army's plans and actions in 
China. There is no way to assess the amount of commodities that were extracted from Central 
China, although the amount of imports in Shanghai provides a rough idea of "missing" goods. It 
is obvious, however, that the Japanese companies were able to collect large quantities of primary 
materials at fairly low prices. It diverted an enormous flow of agricultural products from their 
original places of transformation to reinforce Japanese industries in China and in Japan. 
 
The policies of forced purchases in the countryside and economic blockade around Shanghai had 
disruptive consequences on the organization of agricultural and industrial production in Central 
China. The peasants shifted toward self-reliance or to less controlled commodities, causing a 
decline in rice and cotton production. Local industries found it increasingly difficult to produce 
at reasonable costs and to market their products in the countryside. The main constraint, 
however, was the obstacles on the flow of goods without which the economy of Central China 
could not sustain its development. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese army realized that the region 
had to be turned into an economic basis for Japan's war effort in the Pacific.  Economic 
considerations overwhelmed the previously dominant strategic considerations. The solution to 
revive the economy was sought in the Japanese model of controlled economy (tôsei keizai) applied 
in the home country. The takeover of the International Settlement in Shanghai placed the 
Chinese business organizations and elites at the mercy of the Japanese army. Collaboration was 
inescapable. 
 
The initial attempts took the form of Japanese dominated "Sino-Japanese" merchant 
organizations. It may have afforded the Japanese a greater degree of leverage on the Chinese 
networks, but it failed to bring substantial economic results. Under the "New China Policy" 
signboard, the Wang Jingwei government was also brought into play. The Japanese army made 
concessions and gave more leeway to the Chinese authorities with the hope they would serve 
Japanese plans more efficiently. Whether the "controlled economy" was a success in Japan 
proper is a subject on which my own knowledge is limited. In China the same policy led to a full 
disaster. Whereas the Japanese army had more or less dominated the economic stage, the system 
of controlled economy brought in new and competing players. Despite their military power, the 
Japanese were powerless to prevent the takeover of the system by  the Chinese political and 
economic elites. These elites used their powers and privileges to maximize their resources and 
their profits with little regard for the fate of the non-privileged population. The complex and 
rigid system of control enforced after 1943 created in itself the scarcities that nourished the black 
market, inflation, and speculation.  The economy was caught in a vicious circle. 
 
The system of monopoly instituted in the lower Yangzi area resulted into an enormous waste of 
resources and high levels of corruption. It placed ordinary citizens at the mercy of a host of 
cadres, bureaucrats and military officers who lived off this lucrative trade. The entrepreneurs 
were unable to escape the grip of the government despite their connection with the central or 
local government. The Japanese merchants themselves seriously suffered after the 
implementation of the control system over major commodities, even if they had benefited from 
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various privileges during the first five years of the war. Shanghai, once the economic heart of the 
country simply collapsed. In August 1945, after the Japanese surrender, the situation  was very 
gloomy. An OSS report stated: “ The Shanghai power plant had to supply electricity for the city, 
but it worked at 19 per cent of its pre-war capacity […]. The telephone company was in terrible 
shape due to lack of maintenance and connections were doubtful and poor. No busses were 
operating in the city. The Japanese had confiscated them for their own trucking purposes. 
Tramways operated at 30 per cent efficiency. The few trams being used are jammed at all times 
to overflowing. The greatest disaster was water distribution. All water in Shanghai derived from 
the Huangpu, the most polluted river in the world. All water is in raw state and unfit for human 
consumption ”174. 
 
In spite of all their numerous economic advisors and despite the pressing economic needs the 
army had to satisfy to sustain the war in the Pacific, the Japanese occupiers were unable to turn 
the wealth and resources of Central China and Shanghai to their own advantage. On the 
opposite, their clumsy policies and that of their Chinese allies managed to kill economic 
development and leave the region in the most appalling situation at the end of the war. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
OSS: Office of Strategic Services 
PRO: Public Record Office, London, Kew Garden - WO: War Office 
SHTBSZF: Shanghai tebieshi zhengfu 
SMA: Shanghai Municipal Archives (Shanghai shi dang'anguan) - QZ: quanzong - ML: mulu 
USNACP: United States National Archives at College Park, Maryland 
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